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Abstract: This paper estimates the trade, revenue and welfare effects of the proposed Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM)-Canada FTA on CARICOM countries using a partial equilibrium model. The welfare analysis also 
takes into account the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which was signed in 2008 between the 
CARIFORUM (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic) countries and the EU. The Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) index, trade complementarity index and transition probability matrices are employed to examine 
the dynamics of comparative advantage for CARICOM countries exports to Canada. The results obtained from the 
partial equilibrium model indicate adverse revenue and welfare effects for CARICOM member states. The results 
from various trade indices employed do not provide evidence to suggest that a FTA between CARICOM countries 
and Canada can improve trade outcomes. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The economic effects of North-South FTAs do seem to outline positive benefits for small 
developing countries compared to South-South FTAs (Schiff 1997 and El Agraa 1999). Indeed, 
most South-South FTAs involve countries with similar factor endowments and economic 
constraints which hinder developing countries from realizing the gains from freer trade. Schiff 
(1997) and Schiff and Winters (2003) have argued that North-South FTAs offer more benefits to 
developing countries. In particular, Schiff and Winters (2003, 15) noted that: 
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„If a developing country is going to pursue regionalism, it will almost always do better to sign up with a 
large rich country than with a small poor one. In trade terms, a large rich country is likely to be a more 
efficient supplier of most goods and a source of greater competition for local producers.‟ 
 
North-South trade arrangements can facilitate growth in developing countries by providing their 
south counterparts with access to larger markets, greater transfer of technology and positively 
influencing total factor productivity in developing countries (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Coe 
and Hoffmaister 1999, Schiff and Wang 2003).
3
 On the other hand, Cernat (2003) noted that 
trade arrangements among developing countries can be used as a mechanism to assist small 
countries in the globalization process. Regionalism can facilitate the building of institutional 
capacity whereby government bureaucrats can learn a significant amount of the „tricks of the 
trade‟ required for engaging the multi-lateralization process. However, previous studies have 
shown that North-South FTAs results in adverse trade, revenue and welfare outcomes for 
developing countries (Greenaway and Milner 2006 and Nicholls Nicholls and Colthrust 2001). 
This paper explores this issue by using a partial equilibrium model to estimate the trade, revenue 
and welfare effects of the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA on CARICOM countries.  
 
The pending CARICOM-Canada FTA is the second North-South trade arrangement for 
CARICOM countries, which is expected to replace the existing Caribbean Canada Trade 
Agreement (CARIBCAN). The main feature of the CARIBCAN is that it offers preferential duty 
free access to the Canadian market for a broad range of goods produced within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region. This non-reciprocal trading relationship between CARICOM 
and Canada is not compatible with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and it is expected 
to expire in December 2013 (WTO 2013). Thus, in order for the CARICOM countries to obtain 
duty free access in the Canadian market another trade arrangement that is compatible with WTO 
rules has to be ratified between both parties (see Table A1 for CARICOM‟s trade with the 
Canada). It is against this backdrop that both countries have agreed to explore the prospects of 
forming a FTA. The formation of the CARICOM-Canada FTA is likely to create both 
opportunities and challenges for CARICOM countries. In particular, the FTA would secure duty 
free access for CARICOM countries merchandise exports to the Canadian market. In addition, 
the CARICOM-Canada FTA would expand duty free market access to trade in services and 
provide CARICOM countries with development assistance. The implementation of the 
CARICOM-Canada FTA will result in liberalization of tariffs on all imports from Canada. The 
removal of tariff barriers on regional imports is expected to result in adverse implications in 
terms of declining tariff revenues, regional production and intra-CARICOM trade due to 
increased competition from Canadian imports (Girvan 2009). The contribution of this paper is 
twofold; first, to the best of the author‟s knowledge this is the first attempt to estimate the trade 
and welfare outcomes for CARICOM countries associated with the proposed CARICOM-
Canada FTA. Second, it provides relevant empirics for policy makers to streamline policies in 
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order to benefit from or mitigate any potential losses from the pending FTA. The rest of this 
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the economic pre-conditions of the proposed 
CARICOM-Canada FTA. Sections 3 and 4 outline a partial equilibrium model and results, 
respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic pre-conditions of the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA  
 
As a country remove barriers to trade with respect to a partner country (or the world); there is 
likely to be a process of adjustment occurring in the country‟s production structure. The country 
should begin to specialize in those sectors in which it has a comparative advantage relative to the 
trading partner. As a result, an important ingredient for the success of a FTA depends on the 
prospective members having a strong comparative advantage in different products (Kemal 2004, 
Pitigala 2005). Recent theoretical work by Schiff (2001) on the natural trading partner hypothesis 
has established that a high level of trade complementarity among prospective members of a FTA 
should increase the likelihood that the FTA will be welfare enhancing. Therefore, evaluating the 
pattern and persistence of comparative advantage and trade complementarity are very important 
indicators for determining the success of the proposed FTA between CARICOM countries and 
Canada.  
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage Index and Transition Probability Matrix  
 
The most popular measure of comparative advantage in the literature was developed by Balassa 
(1965) and has been used in many studies to determine the comparative advantage structure of 
countries (for example, Fertő and Hubbard 2003, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 2004, Bojnec 
and Fertő 2006, Sinanan and Hosein 2012). The RCA index also known as the Balassa index is 
outlined as:  
 
wtwj
itij
ij
XX
XX
RCA   
 
Where: ijRCA – the RCA index for country i in commodity j, 
                    X – exports, 
                   w – world, 
                    i – country, 
                    j – commodity,  
                    t – a set of countries.  
 
The RCA index compares the share of exports of commodity j in country i‟s total exports to the 
share of exports of commodity j in the world‟s total exports (world accounts for all other supply 
sources). The notion is that if the share of exports for commodity j in country i‟s total exports is 
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larger than the share of exports for commodity j in world total exports, then country i is 
considered to have a comparative advantage in commodity j. The RCA index has a theoretical 
range from a value greater than zero (0) to less than infinity (∞) which is divided into two 
groups:  
 
0< RCAj < 1 – the country has a comparative disadvantage in commodity j,  
1< RCAj < ∞ – the country has a comparative advantage in the commodity j. 
 
Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2001) provided a further decomposition of the theoretical range 
of the RCA index by dividing the latter range into 3 parts. The decomposition of the theoretical 
range of the RCA index permits the identification of weak, medium and strong comparative 
advantage for the export industries of a country (Table 1). The persistence or mobility of a 
country‟s comparative advantage over time can be examined by applying a transition probability 
matrix and Markov chains to the classification of the RCA index (see Proudman and Redding 
2000, Brasili, Epifani and Helg 2000, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 2001, Hosein 2008, Sinanan 
and Hosein 2012).  
 
 Table 1: Categorization of the Balassa Index 
States   Range  Interpretation  
Class a 0 < RCA < 1 Industries with a comparative disadvantage. 
Class b 1< RCA < 2 Industries with a weak comparative advantage. 
Class c 2 < RCA < 4 Industries with a medium comparative advantage. 
Class d              4 < RCA Industries with a strong comparative advantage. 
Source: Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2001). 
 
A discrete time Markov chain is characterized by a finite set of states at discrete time intervals 
and probabilities (pij) for transition between these states. The transition probability (pij) is the 
probability of a process being in state i at time t and moving to state j at time t+1. The matrix of 
probabilities (pij) for all states is usually referred to as the transition probability matrix of the 
Markov chain. A Markov chain can be formally expressed as: 
 
 iXXiXjXP ttt   ,,..., 1001 ‟ 
                
 iXjXP tt  1  
 
In terms of the RCA index, a transition probability matrix can shed light on the evolution of 
comparative advantage from one time period to another period for an economy. The transition 
probability matrix determines the probability of a commodity moving from one state (say, 
comparative disadvantage (a)) to another state (say, strong comparative advantage (d)) from an 
initial time period (t) to another time period (t+1). The probability of a commodity being in state 
d in the next time period (t+1) given that it is presently (t) in state a is a one-step transition 
probability denoted as 1, ttadP (see Anderson 2011 and Hunter 2012).  
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Where:  aXdXPP ttttad   11,  
 
Additionally, the degree of mobility or persistence in the RCA index is summarized by various 
mobility indices. Shorrocks (1978) developed an index denoted as (M1) which captures the 
relative magnitude of the diagonal and off-diagonal elements in a transition probability matrix.
4
 
The index ranges from 0≤M1≤1, where a value of 0 indicates that there is imperfect mobility or 
total persistence and this occurs when the elements of the leading diagonal of the transition 
probability matrix are equal to one. When there is perfect mobility the index takes on a value of 
one and this occurs when the trace of the transition probability matrix is equal to one and all of 
the elements in the transition probability matrix have the same value. The Shorrocks index is 
defined as: 
1
)(
1 


K
PtrK
M  
 
Where: K – number of classes in the transition probability matrix, 
             P – transition probability matrix, 
       tr (P) – trace of the transition probability matrix.   
 
Data 
 
The RCA and trade complementarity indices are computed at the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) 3 digit level for the period 2000-2010 using trade data from the UN 
Comtrade database. A sample of six CARICOM member‟s exports to Canada is firstly examined 
using the RCA index. The RCA index is then used to calculate a transition probability matrix for 
each CARICOM member‟s exports to Canada. The inter-temporal changes in the RCA index for 
each CARICOM member are briefly summarized in the Tables A3-8. 
 
Evolution of comparative advantage for CARICOM member’s exports to Canada  
 
The results from the transition probability matrices indicate that those commodities in the 
comparative disadvantage class (a) for CARICOM countries exports to Canada have a high 
probability of persistence. The high probability values in class (a) imply that commodities 
revealing a comparative disadvantage are likely to remain in a state of comparative disadvantage 
over time. On the other hand, The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have recorded a 
relatively high probability of persistence in the strong comparative advantage class (d). Jamaica 
revealed the highest probability of persistence (0.80) for commodities in class d, followed by 
Trinidad and Tobago (0.71) and The Bahamas (0.67). These findings mean that commodities 
with a comparative advantage in The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have a high 
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probability of maintaining their comparative advantage rank over time as compared to other 
CARICOM countries. The persistence of commodities in class b and c for all the selected 
CARICOM countries‟ exports to Canada appear to be very weak, with the exception of Jamaica 
for the weak comparative advantage class. 
 
The dynamic changes in the comparative advantage structure of an economy is usually observed 
through the off-diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix, i.e. by comparing the 
lower triangular to the upper triangular matrix. It is preferred to have a strong upper triangular 
matrix as it indicates that commodities are migrating from a lower class of comparative 
advantage to a higher class of comparative advantage. However, from Table 2 there appears to 
be a relatively weak upper triangular matrix as compared to the lower triangular matrix. The 
weak upper triangular matrix of the transition probability matrix indicate that the probability of 
commodities moving from a lower class of comparative advantage to a higher class of 
comparative advantage is very low for all of the selected CARICOM countries exports to 
Canada. Furthermore, the probability of losing comparative advantage from the start of the 
period (2000) to the end of the period (2010) is very high for the selected CARICOM members.  
 
Table 2: Transition probability matrix of the BI for selected CARICOM countries in relation to 
Canada 
(From 2000-2002 to 2008-2010). 
Barbados  The Bahamas  
 To  To 
  
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
a 0.94 0.03 0.00 0.03 a 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.01 
b 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 b 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
c 0.43 0.14 0.43 0.00 c 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
d 0.73 0.09 0.09 0.09 d 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.67 
M1 0.79       M1 0.78       
Guyana  Jamaica  
To To 
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
a 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 
b 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 b 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
c 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
d 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.33 d 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 
M1 0.89       M1 0.40       
Trinidad and Tobago St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
To To 
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
F
ro
m
 
  a b c d 
a 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.94 0.02 0.01 0.03 
b 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 b 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00 
c 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 
d 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.71 d 0.50 0.00 0.13 0.38 
M1 0.65       M1 0.81       
Source: own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
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Trade complementarity between CARICOM and Canada 
 
The ability for a FTA to improve the economic outcomes of its members can also be determined 
by an examination of their bilateral trade structures. The more complementary the nature of the 
trading relationship between the prospective members of a FTA, the greater is the likelihood that 
the FTA will improve the economic outcomes for its members.
5
 The level of trade 
complementarity between the CARICOM bloc and Canada is evaluated by a trade 
complementarity index.
6
 The main proponents (Michaely 1996 and Yeats 1998) of the trade 
complementarity index argued that the higher the value of the trade complementarity index the 
more likely the proposed FTA will succeed (Pitigala 2005). The trade complementarity index has 
a theoretical range from a value greater than 0 to less than ∞. If the value of the trade 
complementarity index is greater than unity then bilateral trade complementarity exists, however, 
if the value of the index is less than unity then bilateral trade complementarity is not present.  
Figure 1 shows the results of the trade complementarity index for the CARICOM bloc in relation 
to Canada, the EU and USA. The trade complementarity index indicates that the level of trade 
complementarity between CARICOM and Canada is generally low and has been declining over 
the last two decades. In fact, the level of trade complementarity is much lower for Canada as 
compared to the EU in the last decade.  
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Where: Cij is a trade complementarity index which relates the comparative advantage of the exporting country to the 
comparative disadvantage of the importing partner weighted against world trade (which accounts for all other supply 
sources), X –exports, k commodity to the world, Xi – country i total exports, Mj – country j total imports, Mi – 
country i total imports and Mw – world imports.  
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Figure 1: Trade complementarity between CARICOM and major trading partners for merchandise trade 
Source: Own calculations based on UN Comtrade (2013).
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The low level of bilateral trade complementarity between the CARICOM region and Canada 
implies that bilateral merchandise trade is not likely to improve with the FTA. In this regard, the 
next section outlines the mechanics of a partial equilibrium model to determine the welfare 
effects on CARICOM countries from liberalizing tariffs on merchandise imports from Canada.  
 
3. Measuring the Welfare Effects of the CARICOM-Canada FTA  
 
Partial equilibrium models have been widely used in the literature to assess the trade and welfare 
effects of proposed FTAs (see McKay, Milner and Morrissey 2000, Greenaway and Milner 2006, 
Gasiorek and Winters 2004, Busse, Borrmann and GroBmann 2004, Karingi et al. 2005 and 
Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen 2007, Busse and Luehje 2007, Hosein 2008, Fontagne, Laborde and 
Mitaritonna 2011). The major benefits of using a partial equilibrium model include its ability to 
provide a detailed analysis from a product and country perspective (Lang 2006). A partial 
equilibrium analysis allows for the identification of commodity groups that are most likely to be 
affected and the extent of the effect on account of freer trade with a prospective trading partner. 
Moreover, the partial equilibrium model facilitates the estimation of trade creation, trade 
diversion, tariff revenues and welfare implications associated with liberalizing trade barriers (see 
for example, McKay, Milner and Morrissey 2000, Greenaway and Milner 2006, Zouhon-Bi and 
Nielsen 2007). The literature identifies two branches of the partial equilibrium model, namely, 
the perfect substitution model and the imperfect substitution model. The perfect substitution 
model assumes a homogeneous product, perfectly competitive and imported goods are perfect 
substitutes for domestically produced goods. The perfect substitution model is most applicable in 
situations where there are specific markets and where the producers are price takers. On the other 
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hand, the imperfect substitution model is grounded in the Armington (1969) principle of product 
differentiation. The imperfect substitution variant is more applicable for industrial markets where 
product differentiation becomes essential to the analysis. This paper uses the imperfect 
substitution approach since it allows for the identification of the various trade source substitution 
effects that arises when a FTA is formed. The remainder of this section outlines a partial 
equilibrium model to evaluate the trade and welfare effects of the proposed CARICOM-Canada 
FTA. 
 
Imperfect substitution model  
 
The imperfect substitution model outlined by Greenaway and Milner (2006) defines the trading 
players in the world as belonging to an intra-regional group (say, CARICOM) and an extra-
regional group.  
 
The intra-regional trading partners are:  
 
HC – Home Country, 
PC – Partner Country, 
 
The extra-regional trading partners are:  
 
CAN – Canada, 
ROW – Rest of the world, excluding Canada. 
 
The initial trading environment is one that is characterized by a situation where the HC and the 
PC belongs to a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA). Assume that the RTA imposes a non-
discriminatory tariff on imports from all extra-regional import sources. Then the price facing 
consumers in the HC‟s market would be PP, PROW (1+t) and PCAN (1+t) from the PC, the ROW 
and Canada, respectively. The initial volume of imports by the HC is given as M1, M2 and M3 
from CARICOM (1), the ROW (2) and Canada (3), respectively. 
 
Next, suppose that CARICOM and Canada forms a FTA. The CARICOM-Canada FTA will 
result in the removal of tariffs on imports from Canada but not for imports from the ROW. This 
change in relative import prices would alter the trading opportunities for consumers in the HC. 
For example, as the price of imports from Canada falls, the consumers in the HC would increase 
their demand for imports from Canada and simultaneously reduce their imports from the ROW 
and the PC. The overall trade effects associated with the CARICOM-Canada FTA can be 
disaggregated into three parts. The three trade effects are known as a trade diversion effect, a 
consumption induced trade creation effect, and a displacement of regional imports effect 
(Greenaway and Milner 2006). The trade effects are outlined below. 
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Trade Creation Effect 
 
The trade creation effect represents the increase in imports from Canada by the HC in the FTA 
environment. The trade creation effect occurs when the tariff is removed on imports from 
Canada such that the price of Canadian goods in the HC falls from PCAN (1+t) to PCAN, where 
PCAN (1+t) > PCAN. This will result in an increase in imports from Canada of the amount M3 to 
M'3 where, M'3 > M3. The change in imports from Canada (∆M3) by the HC can be measured 
empirically by:  
 
33
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Where: ∆M3 - change in imports from Canada,   
                   t - tariff rate, 
               e
d
m - elasticity of demand for imports,  
               M3 - amount imported from Canada prior to the formation of the FTA, 
              M'3 - new imports from Canada. 
 
Trade Diversion Effect  
 
A switch of imports from one extra-regional partner (ROW) to another extra-regional partner 
(CAN) in the FTA environment represents the trade diversion effect. Trade diversion occurs 
when some of the HC‟s imports from the ROW are diverted to Canada; say the HC‟s imports 
from the ROW falls from M2 to M'2, where M'2 < M2. The change in imports from the ROW 
(∆M2) can be measured empirically in a similar way as the change in imports from Canada as:  
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Where: ∆M2 - change in imports from the ROW,  
                   t - tariff rate, 
               σ23 - elasticity of import substitution for CARICOM countries between imports from 
the ROW and Canada,  
               M2 - amount imported from the ROW prior to the formation of the FTA, 
              M'2 - new imports from the ROW. 
 
Displacement of Regional Imports   
 
The FTA between the RTA (HC + PC) and Canada also results in some of the HC‟s imports 
from the PC‟s market being replaced by imports from Canada, say, from M1 to M‟1 where M‟1< 
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M1. The change in imports from the PC can be measured in a similar way as the change in 
imports from Canada and the change in imports from the ROW. The new imports from Canada 
are determined by the change in the import price, initial imports and the elasticity of import 
demand: 
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Where: ∆M1 - change in imports from the PC,   
                   t - tariff rate, 
               σ13 - elasticity of import substitution between CARICOM countries and Canada,   
               M1 - amount imported from the PC prior to the formation of the FTA, 
               M'1 - new imports from the PC. 
 
Revenue and Welfare effects 
 
The welfare effect for a HC in the CARICOM sphere from the CARICOM-Canada FTA 
originates from two sources, namely the change in tariff revenues and the change in consumer 
surplus for the HC. Firstly, the FTA between CARICOM countries and Canada alters the relative 
import prices for the HC consumers from the various sources of supply (Canada, ROW and 
CARICOM). As a result, consumers in the HC will benefit from a lower import price with the 
preferential partner country (Canada). This change results in an increase in imports from the 
preferential market at a lower price, thus leading to an increase in consumer surplus and 
impacting positively on the HC‟s welfare. On the other hand, the HC consumers can substitute 
imports from the intra-regional partners to the extra-regional partners (CARICOM to Canada) 
and among the extra-regional partners (ROW to Canada). The substitution of intra-regional 
imports for extra-regional imports has no effect on tariff revenues as there is an RTA among the 
intra-regional partners. However, the reallocation of imports among the extra-regional partners 
(from the ROW to Canada) on account of a FTA will negatively impact the HC‟s welfare 
through losses in tariff revenues. The loss in tariff revenues for the HC takes two forms, firstly, 
the loss in revenues from Canada and secondly, the loss in tariff revenues on the amount of 
imports diverted from the ROW to Canada. The change in tariff revenues is determined by the 
difference between the initial revenues  0R obtained in the pre-FTA environment and the new 
revenues  1R obtained in the FTA environment. The basic algebra associated with the change in 
revenues is sketched below.    
 
01 RRR   
 
'
21 tMR    
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230 tMtMR   
 
32 tMMtR   
 
Where: tM2 - the tariff revenues associated with a change in imports from the ROW, 
               tM3 - the initial tariff revenues collected from Canadian imports in the pre- FTA 
environment,  
                 R1 - the new tariff revenues for the HC in the FTA environment, 
                 R0 - the initial tariff revenues for the HC in the pre-FTA environment, 
                R - the change in tariff revenues.  
 
Therefore, the change in welfare is a function of the change in consumer surplus and the change 
in tariff revenues. This is outlined below as: 
 
RCSW   
 
Substituting ∆CS and ∆R into the ∆W yields; 
 
  RMtW  3
2
1
 
 
Data: Import demand and substitution elasticities 
 
The estimation of trade creation and trade diversion in an imperfect substitution setting requires 
knowledge of various elasticities. Specifically, the Greenaway and Milner (2006) model calls for 
information on the import demand elasticities and the elasticities of substitution between 
preferred and non-preferred trading partners.  
 
In the literature, several studies have utilized various estimates of import demand and 
substitution elasticities. For example, Busse and Shams (2005) followed the standard “Dutch” 
convention, which assumed that the values for import demand elasticity and the elasticity of 
substitution were 0.5 and 2.0, respectively. According to Busse and Shams (2005), the assumed 
elasticity values of the standard “Dutch” convention were very similar to the estimates of import 
demand and substitution elasticities developed by Kee, Olarreaga and Nicita (2004) and 
Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003). Another study also conducted by Busse, Borrmann and 
GroBmann (2004) on the EPA between Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and EU assumed values for the import demand and substitution elasticities 
respectively since reliable estimates for both import demand and substitution elasticities were not 
available. In particular, Busse, Borrmann and GroBmann (2004) established three scenarios; a 
low, a mid and a high. The import demand and elasticity of substitution values were different in 
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each scenario and were also based on the degree of homogeneity for the products which were 
differentiated between agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods. The 
elasticity values assumed by Busse, Borrmann and GroBmann (2004) were similar to elasticity 
values in other developing countries (see Sawyer and Sprinkle 1999, Gallaway, McDaniel and 
Rivera 2003 and Kee, Olarreaga and Nicita 2004). Greenaway and Milner (2006) used the import 
demand elasticities based on Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976) while the relevant import 
source substitution elasticities were acquired from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
behavioural parameters file (Hertel et al. 1997). For enhanced comparability with the Greenaway 
and Milner (2006) study, the experiments conducted in this paper also used the various 
elasticities employed by Greenaway and Milner (2006).
8
 
 
The Greenaway and Milner (2006) methodology for determining trade and welfare effects is then 
applied to SITC 2-digit data for a selected group of 11 CARICOM countries for the years 1998 
and 2008 (see Table A2 for data sources). Similar to Greenaway and Milner (2006) and Hosein 
(2008), both the import demand elasticities and the import source substitution elasticities are 
assumed to be the same across CARICOM countries for a particular product group. Moreover, 
we assume complete tariff liberalization of Canadian exports into the CARICOM market (see 
Busse, Borrmann and GroBmann 2004, Greenaway and Milner 2006, Lang 2006 and Hosein 
2008 for similar assumptions).   
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
This section now turns to the results of the trade and welfare effects of the proposed CARICOM-
Canada FTA.
9
 It should be noted that this is a static study and will undertake several 
permutations. Specifically, comparative FTA experiments with CARICOM countries and 
Canada as well as with other countries for the years 1998 and 2008 are examined. The grounding 
in 1998 is for comparison with Greenaway and Milner (2006). The remainder of this section is 
divided into three parts:
 10
  
 
I. Trade effects for full liberalization of tariffs on imports from Canada only, EU only and EU 
and Canada only. 
                                                 
8
 The reference to Greenaway and Milner (2006) is to compare trade and welfare effects of CARIFORUM–EU EPA 
with the proposed CARICOM-Canada.  
9
 The trade, revenue and welfare effects computed here are based on the assumption that a FTA is formed between 
Canada and CARICOM in either 1998 or in 2008 so that tariffs on import originating from Canada (and other 
prospective preferential trading partners outlined in the various experiments) are eliminated. 
10
 The CARIFORUM–EU EPA was signed in October 2008 and thus will therefore not affect the experiments 
undertaken for liberalizing EU imports or Canada imports. 
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II. Revenue effects for full liberalization of tariffs on imports from Canada only, EU only and 
EU and Canada only. 
III. Welfare effects for full liberalization of tariffs on imports from Canada only, EU only and 
EU and Canada only. 
 
The impact of full liberalization of tariffs on imports from Canada only, EU only and EU 
and Canada only  
 
This part considers four issues. Firstly, it examines three trade effects associated with the 
proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA; secondly it updates the work of Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) and compares the results of the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA to the updated results 
associated with the EPA.
11
 Finally an experiment involving the liberalization of tariffs on 
imports from Canada and the EU is examined. The trade effects for each experiment are 
aggregated across all SITC 2 digit commodities and are provided in the Tables below. In 
columns 1 and 2, the trade creation on existing imports from the prospective trading partners are 
reported while in columns 3 and 4 the change in imports from CARICOM countries 
(displacement of regional imports) are shown and columns 5 and 6 shows the change in extra-
regional imports (trade diversion).  
 
Trade effects for the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA 
 
The first experiment indicates that the percentage increase in trade creation range from 8.4 per 
cent for Trinidad and Tobago to 17.7 per cent for Grenada. In actual dollars, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago are the two CARICOM countries expected to benefit the most from trade 
creation on existing Canadian imports (see Table 3). Trade creation for Trinidad and Tobago and 
Jamaica using 2008 data is estimated to be US$21.79mn and US$22.11mn, respectively. Belize 
recorded the least trade creation from liberalizing tariffs on Canadian imports amounting to 
US$0.74mn, an increase by 11.2 per cent.  
 
The percentage decline in regional imports ranges from 17.9 per cent for Barbados to 28.12 per 
cent for Belize. In actual dollars, the displacement of regional imports towards Canada is likely 
to be the greatest for Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana. The results imply that Jamaica‟s imports 
from CARICOM is expected to decrease by US$303.97mn (18.6 per cent) while for Barbados 
and Guyana it is likely to fall by US$79.41mn (17.9 per cent) and US$78.90mn (22.9 per cent), 
respectively.
12
 Extra-regional trade diversion which measures the switch in import source from 
the rest of the world towards Canada ranges from 39.6 per cent for Trinidad and Tobago to 64.6 
                                                 
11
 Greenaway and Milner computed the trade and welfare effects for full liberalization of tariffs on EU imports for 9 
CARICOM countries for 1998; this study extends the list to 11 CARICOM countries‟ and compare the results with 
similar experiments for 2008. 
12
 These values are uniform for all the various experiments. It represents the decline in import from the CARICOM 
market by each CARICOM member state.  
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per cent for St. Lucia. Other CARICOM countries to report significant extra-regional trade 
diversion are Jamaica, The Bahamas, Barbados and Guyana. The extra-regional trade diversion 
effect represents a significant opportunity for an increase in Canadian exports to the CARICOM 
market (an estimated total of US$10,398mn) on account of the relatively lower FTA import price 
for CARICOM consumers.  
 
Table 3: Trade effects associated with the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA 
(US$mn) 
 
Trade Creation on 
existing CAN imports 
Change in 
CARICOM imports 
Change in extra-
regional imports 
 
CAN 
(1998) 
CAN 
(2008) 
CAN 
(1998) 
CAN 
(2008) 
CAN 
(1998) 
CAN 
(2008) 
BHS 7.12 1.44 -1.49 -8.48 -1009.22 -1522.70 
BLZ 0.93 0.74 -2.73 -3.44 -144.06 -308.03 
BRB 4.56 5.90 -34.17 -79.41 -492.94 -676.30 
DMA 0.45 0.82 -8.87 -15.87 -54.63 -84.36 
GRD 1.09 1.78 -13.95 -24.76 -80.28 -138.65 
GUY 2.17 2.11 -17.80 -78.90 -197.70 -432.65 
JAM 16.16 22.11 -89.73 -303.97 -1580.60 -3000.23 
KNA 0.56 1.08 -6.55 -12.30 -67.18 -163.58 
LCA 1.71 1.87 -18.32 -47.61 -147.93 -285.26 
TTO 16.42 21.79 -25.56 -34.26 -1092.64 -3643.57 
VCT 0.65 1.23 -12.25 -23.77 -71.15 -142.95 
Percentage change  
BHS 18.68 12.79 -34.9 -20.81 -57.81 -50.24 
BLZ 16.01 11.18 -25.8 -28.12 -52.60 -48.93 
BRB 11.06 10.20 -21.0 -17.96 -60.51 -54.81 
DMA 16.42 13.05 -25.6 -22.33 -56.48 -55.00 
GRD 17.25 17.66 -25.1 -22.88 -58.16 -56.66 
GUY 13.02 11.71 -23.5 -19.62 -49.11 -46.80 
JAM 17.94 16.83 -28.9 -18.59 -63.29 -45.64 
KNA 16.71 16.10 -23.6 -22.31 -57.31 -62.30 
LCA 14.92 15.85 -26.0 -23.78 -58.79 -64.60 
TTO 15.79 8.40 -24.4 -27.93 -39.14 -39.64 
VCT 13.65 15.56 -26.0 -23.31 -50.77 -54.37 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
 
Trade effects for the EPA with the EU  
 
With respect to the EU, the percentage increase in trade creation range from 12.6 per cent for 
Trinidad and Tobago to 19.3 per cent for The Bahamas using 2008 data. For 2008, there was a 
small increase in trade creation (in actual dollars) for all CARICOM countries except The 
Bahamas. This is not a surprising trend as one would expect that over time in a rapidly 
globalizing world economy trade source substitution towards the EU and Canada would increase, 
albeit a small increase. Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica recorded the largest increase in trade 
creation on EU imports from 1998 to 2008 (see Table 4). The decline in extra-regional imports 
ranged from 40.1 per cent for Trinidad and Tobago to 64.9 per cent for St. Lucia in 2008. There 
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is a general increase in extra-regional trade diversion (in actual dollars) for all CARICOM 
countries. Moreover, Trinidad and Tobago recorded the largest increase in trade diversion in 
actual dollars from the listed CARICOM countries.  
 
Table 4: Trade effects associated with the EPA (US$mn) 
 
Trade Creation on 
existing EU imports 
Change in CARICOM 
imports 
Change in extra-
regional imports 
 
EU  
(1998) 
EU 
(2008) 
EU  
(1998) 
EU  
(2008) 
EU  
(1998) 
EU  
(2008) 
BHS 13.62 7.61 -1.49 -8.36 -982.56 -1500.49 
BLZ 4.30 5.24 -2.73 -3.38 -121.69 -288.00 
BRB 26.53 32.83 -34.17 -71.81 -311.22 -589.44 
DMA 3.18 3.41 -8.87 -15.72 -41.38 -75.47 
GRD 4.44 5.86 -13.95 -24.59 -62.77 -124.95 
GUY 10.15 14.94 -17.80 -64.81 -171.50 -412.83 
JAM 44.93 85.32 -89.73 -294.12 -1310.64 -2842.30 
KNA 2.57 3.40 -6.55 -12.09 -55.23 -154.85 
LCA 7.89 9.63 -18.32 -47.30 -112.88 -258.87 
TTO 59.51 150.18 -25.56 -32.47 -969.14 -3312.19 
VCT 6.03 8.77 -12.25 -23.71 -50.26 -119.85 
Percentage change  
BHS 14.6 19.26 -34.9 -20.66 -58.1 -49.97 
BLZ 15.7 15.21 -25.8 -27.87 -48.2 -47.86 
BRB 15.5 14.25 -21.0 -18.32 -45.5 -53.03 
DMA 15.4 15.39 -25.6 -22.34 -52.2 -54.62 
GRD 15.5 15.16 -25.1 -22.87 -54.3 -57.65 
GUY 13.4 13.69 -23.5 -20.19 -50.5 -45.15 
JAM 15.8 16.75 -28.9 -18.22 -56.9 -45.72 
KNA 15.0 16.01 -23.6 -22.31 -54.2 -62.18 
LCA 15.0 17.47 -26.0 -23.70 -54.9 -64.89 
TTO 12.2 12.57 -24.4 -27.66 -39.9 -40.09 
VCT 14.7 16.20 -26.0 -23.31 -48.4 -55.26 
Source: own calculation from UN Comtrade (2012) and Greenaway and Milner (2006) 
for 1998 values for EU only.  
 
Trade effects for the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA and the EPA 
 
Another relevant experiment is to examine the impact of removing tariffs on imports from both 
EU and Canada simultaneously on CARICOM countries as this is likely to be the most practical 
scenario in medium term. This permutation explores the CARICOM-Canada FTA in the context 
of an already signed EPA with the EU. The results associated with this experiment are provided 
in Table 5. The impact of full tariff liberalization of EU and Canadian imports on CARICOM 
countries showed that the increase in trade creation is higher as compared to the two previous 
individual country cases discussed above. The two major beneficiaries from trade creation are 
again Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. A similar trend was observed for the extra-regional 
trade diversion. In general, adding Canada to the mix does not create any significant optimism 
for CARICOM countries, especially the smaller island states. The inclusion of Canada to 
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CARICOM‟s list of FTA trading partners although not counter-productive in a dynamic trading 
environment does not add significant value from a trade creation (diversion) perspective. 
 
Table 5: Trade effects of the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA and the EPA (US$mn) 
 
Trade Creation 
Displacement in regional 
imports 
Trade diversion 
 
CAN+EU  
 (1998) 
CAN+EU   
(2008) 
CAN+EU  
 (1998) 
CAN+EU   
(2008) 
CAN+EU  
 (1998) 
CAN+EU   
(2008) 
BHS 20.73 9.05 -1.49 -8.48 -964.90 -1494.79 
BLZ 5.22 5.98 -2.73 -3.44 -129.05 -284.97 
BRB 31.56 38.72 -34.17 -79.41 -392.81 -551.30 
DMA 3.86 4.23 -8.87 -15.87 -42.27 -71.97 
GRD 5.54 7.63 -13.95 -24.76 -64.10 -118.24 
GUY 12.32 17.05 -17.80 -78.90 -162.10 -376.82 
JAM 62.09 107.43 -89.73 -303.97 -1425.72 -2733.90 
KNA 3.16 4.48 -6.55 -12.30 -57.78 -150.29 
LCA 10.80 11.50 -18.32 -47.61 -114.78 -249.80 
TTO 76.65 171.96 -25.56 -34.26 -916.80 -3226.98 
VCT 6.72 10.00 -12.25 -23.77 -51.37 -114.70 
Percentage change  
BHS 15.75 17.83 -34.9 -20.81 -58.41 -49.97 
BLZ 15.81 14.56 -25.8 -28.12 -52.32 -47.89 
BRB 14.76 13.44 -21.0 -17.96 -61.17 -54.95 
DMA 15.37 14.87 -25.6 -22.33 -56.82 -54.86 
GRD 15.84 15.67 -25.1 -22.88 -58.60 -57.39 
GUY 13.35 13.41 -23.5 -19.62 -49.58 -46.22 
JAM 16.26 16.76 -28.9 -18.59 -64.64 -45.08 
KNA 15.11 16.03 -23.6 -22.31 -57.99 -62.27 
LCA 14.45 17.18 -26.0 -23.78 -60.96 -64.64 
TTO 12.83 11.83 -24.4 -27.93 -39.89 -40.35 
VCT 14.32 16.11 -26.0 -23.31 -52.41 -54.95 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
 
Comparison of the trade effects for the proposed CARICOM-Canada FTA and the EPA 
 
In the first instance, trade creation in actual dollars recorded for the full liberalization of tariffs 
on Canadian imports by CARICOM economies is lower than on EU imports for both years in 
which the experiments are conducted. These results imply that the liberalization of tariffs on EU 
imports yields significantly greater positive results for CARICOM countries from a trade 
creation perspective as compared to the liberalization of tariff on imports from Canada.  
 
CARICOM countries dependence on import duties 
 
Before turning to the tariff revenue effects of the FTAs on CARICOM countries, this section will 
examine the extent to which CARICOM countries depend on import duties. The dependence on 
tariff revenues is examined using three indicators; (1) import duties as a share in current 
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revenues, (2) import duties as a share in tax revenues and (3) import duties as a share in GDP for 
the period 2000-2011. Nicholls, Nicholls and Colthrust (2001) identified three levels of tariff 
revenue dependence for an economy. In the first instance, a country is classified as having a low 
dependence on tariff revenues if import duties account for less than 15 per cent of government 
revenues, moderate dependence if import duties account for greater than 15 per cent of 
government revenues but less than 30 per cent of government revenues and high dependence if 
import duties account for more than 30 per cent of government revenues. The table below shows 
the level of tariff revenue dependence for a selected group of CARICOM countries for the period 
2000-2011. According to the categories of tariff revenue dependence, CARICOM countries are 
classified as having a low dependence on tariff revenues (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Dependence on import duties for selected CARICOM countries (2000-2011) 
 
% in Current revenues % in tax revenues % in GDP 
Selected CARICOM countries
a
 
DMA 10.60 12.01 2.67 
GRD 11.96 12.90 2.37 
JAM 6.50 7.88 2.05 
KNA 10.67 14.50 2.84 
LCA 13.49 14.60 3.17 
TTO 4.97 5.98 1.47 
VCT 9.39 10.46 2.29 
Other developing countries and the USA 
BOL 3.88 5.41 0.41 
BRA 2.35 3.51 0.54 
COL 5.77 8.59 0.93 
CRI 3.25 5.58 0.27 
DOM 8.75 9.66 0.79 
GTM 9.50 9.99 1.12 
HND 5.05 7.14 0.80 
PER 4.66 6.13 0.81 
PRY 9.82 14.95 1.51 
SLV 5.48 7.60 0.79 
URY 4.02 6.07 1.08 
USA 1.10 1.89 0.18 
Source: Own calculations from World Development Indicators (2013). 
a 
Data for other CARICOM members are not available.   
 
The share of tariff revenues in tax revenues ranges from 5.98 per cent for Trinidad and Tobago to 
14.6 per cent for St. Lucia for the period 2000-2011. Despite the low levels of tariff revenue 
dependence in general, the OECS countries in Table 6 have a relatively higher dependence on 
tariff revenues than Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.
13
 Tariff revenues as a share in tax 
revenues and current revenues averaged over 10 per cent for OECS members with the highest 
being observed for St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis at 14.6 and 14.5 per cent, respectively. 
Additionally, CARICOM countries have a higher level of tariff revenue dependence compared to 
                                                 
13
 Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) members are, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.    
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other developing countries in Latin and Central America. In this regard, the removal of tariffs on 
imports can have adverse implications on CARICOM countries, particularly, the OECS 
members.  
 
Revenue effects of full liberalization of tariff on EU and Canada imports.  
 
Table 7 reports the revenue effects associated with the full liberalization of tariffs on Canadian 
imports only, EU imports only, and Canadian and EU imports only. The percentage decline in 
tariff revenues from liberalizing tariffs on Canadian imports range from 51.4 per cent for 
Trinidad and Tobago to 72.7 per cent St. Kitts and Nevis. The findings from the three FTA 
scenarios indicate the smaller economies (Dominica, Grenada St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines) are likely to experience a higher percentage decline on tariff 
revenues than the larger CARICOM countries (see Table 7). The fall in tariff revenues from 
liberalizing tariffs on EU imports only revealed similar results. On the other hand, the four 
CARICOM countries expected to experience the most losses in actual dollars from liberalizing 
tariffs on Canadian imports are Trinidad and Tobago (US$429mn), Jamaica (US$411.4mn) and 
The Bahamas (US$199.9mn). The revenue losses from the simultaneous removal of tariffs on 
imports from EU and Canada are obviously higher. Although the tariff revenue losses are higher 
than the two previous FTA experiments, they are not significantly different, especially for the 
listed OECS countries.  
 
The loss in tariff revenues would present a greater challenge for the smaller economies since 
they have a higher dependence on tariff revenues as a source of their total revenues compared to 
the larger CARICOM countries.    
 
Table 7: Revenue effects associated with the various trade agreements  
  Change in Revenue (US$mn) 
  
CAN 
(1998) 
CAN  
(2008) 
EU  
(1998) 
EU  
(2008) 
CAN+EU  
(1998) 
CAN+EU  
(2008) 
BHS -132.06 -196.93 -133.21 -197.82 -134.77 -198.16 
BLZ -18.63 -36.84 -19.36 -37.58 -19.60 -37.80 
BRB -64.42 -88.65 -67.50 -94.85 -69.18 -95.25 
DMA -7.44 -11.19 -8.08 -11.82 -8.17 -11.95 
GRD -10.77 -18.89 -11.54 -19.98 -11.75 -20.28 
GUY -24.43 -51.42 -27.38 -57.72 -26.96 -55.36 
JAM -228.91 -411.42 -234.99 -428.74 -237.90 -427.85 
KNA -9.19 -23.39 -9.58 -23.91 -9.79 -24.07 
LCA -21.33 -39.62 -22.35 -41.08 -23.38 -41.35 
TTO -132.63 -429.04 -144.33 -461.89 -147.07 -467.14 
VCT -8.82 -18.81 -10.12 -20.42 -10.30 -20.66 
Percentage Change in revenue decline  
BHS -69.28 -61.87 -69.9 -62.14 -70.70 -62.26 
BLZ -65.38 -59.98 -68.0 -61.16 -68.78 -61.53 
BRB -74.47 -71.28 -78.1 -73.77 -79.97 -76.58 
DMA -69.47 -68.17 -75.1 -71.74 -76.31 -72.83 
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GRD -69.39 -67.35 -74.4 -71.07 -75.71 -72.31 
GUY -65.60 -59.49 -71.6 -61.28 -72.40 -64.06 
JAM -74.71 -60.93 -76.7 -63.08 -77.64 -63.37 
KNA -69.19 -72.72 -73.0 -74.13 -73.74 -74.84 
LCA -71.89 -72.06 -76.8 -74.57 -78.78 -75.19 
TTO -57.22 -51.40 -61.8 -55.28 -63.45 -55.97 
VCT -62.75 -66.27 -72.0 -71.84 -73.31 -72.76 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012) and Greenaway and Milner (2006) for 1998 values for EU 
only. 
 
Impact of revenue decline on the macroeconomy  
 
The impact of a decline in tariffs on tax revenues is expected to be largest for the least developed 
countries in the CARICOM region. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia are likely to 
experience a decline in tax revenue of about 15 per cent (see Table 8). Therefore, while the 
larger economies in the CARICOM are expected to experience larger tariff revenues losses in 
actual dollars, the smaller economies are expected to experience more adverse effects on their 
macroeconomy. 
 
Table 8: Impact of revenue decline on tax revenues and GDP 
 
CAN (2008) EU (2008) CAN+EU (2008) 
 
Tax 
revenue 
(%)  
GDP  
(%) 
Tax 
revenue  
(%) 
GDP 
(%) 
Tax 
revenue  
(%) 
GDP  
(%) 
DMA -9.86 -2.42 -10.41 -2.56 -10.53 -2.59 
GRD -11.77 -2.27 -12.46 -2.40 -12.64 -2.44 
JAM -11.55 -3.15 -12.04 -3.28 -12.01 -3.28 
KNA -15.03 -3.16 -15.36 -3.23 -15.47 -3.26 
LCA -14.79 -3.38 -15.33 -3.50 -15.43 -3.52 
TTO -5.20 -1.53 -5.60 -1.65 -5.66 -1.67 
VCT -11.36 -2.69 -12.33 -2.92 -12.47 -2.96 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012) and WDI (2012). 
 
Welfare effects of full liberalization of tariffs on EU and Canada imports only 
 
This part compares the welfare effects of full liberalization of tariffs on EU imports only, 
Canadian imports only and EU and Canadian imports only. The decline in welfare for 
CARICOM countries because of the full liberalization of tariffs on EU imports are recorded in 
Table 9. Jamaica, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago are the three CARICOM countries that 
are expected to be the most affected while Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
recorded the least negative effects using 1998 data. For 2008, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica 
again stand out as the countries that are expected to experience major declines in welfare. In 
comparison, the fall in welfare for CARICOM countries because of the full liberalization of 
tariffs on Canada imports are slightly lower as compared to the EU for each of the listed 
CARICOM member states (see Table 9). The welfare loss for most CARICOM countries on 
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account of liberalizing tariffs on EU and Canadian imports are not significantly different from 
the welfare loss associated with liberalizing tariffs on EU imports.  
 
Table 9: Welfare effects of the various trade agreements  
Change in Welfare (US$mn) 
  
CAN 
(1998) 
CAN 
(2008) 
EU 
(1998) 
EU 
(2008) 
CAN+EU 
(1998) 
CAN+EU 
(2008) 
BHS -89.66 -146.25 -90.64 -146.89 -91.87 -147.17 
BLZ -12.89 -24.68 -16.10 -25.22 -13.65 -25.42 
BRB -32.12 -50.56 -48.73 -55.83 -36.16 -56.12 
DMA -5.38 -7.73 -5.54 -8.23 -5.94 -8.33 
GRD -7.60 -13.99 -8.08 -14.91 -8.37 -15.11 
GUY -15.23 -36.97 -18.03 -42.21 -17.32 -40.28 
JAM -126.30 -303.44 -203.61 -313.67 -133.01 -315.81 
KNA -6.87 -17.89 -7.54 -18.26 -7.34 -18.38 
LCA -14.79 -24.90 -15.78 -26.10 -16.40 -26.27 
TTO -103.61 -359.63 -108.37 -387.55 -115.78 -392.00 
VCT -6.79 -13.46 -6.05 -14.76 -7.99 -14.92 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012) and Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) for 1998 values for EU only. 
 
Impact of welfare decline on the macro economy  
 
Table 10 shows that the macro economy of the smaller countries in the CARICOM region are 
likely to be affected the most by a decline in welfare from the CARICOM-Canada FTA.  
 
Table 10: Impact of welfare decline on GDP (%) 
 
CAN (2008) EU (2008) CAN+EU (2008) 
DMA -1.67 -1.78 -1.80 
GRD -1.68 -1.79 -1.82 
JAM -2.32 -2.40 -2.42 
KNA -2.42 -2.47 -2.49 
LCA -2.12 -2.22 -2.24 
TTO -1.28 -1.38 -1.40 
VCT -1.93 -2.11 -2.14 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade and WDI (2012). 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
The results obtained from the partial equilibrium model shows that while there is likely to be 
some trade creation from the CARICOM-Canada FTA, the overall revenue and welfare effects 
from a static perspective will be unfavourable for CARICOM countries. The extent of the impact 
of the trade creation effects varies considerably among CARICOM countries with the major 
beneficiaries being members of the MDCs, namely, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. Together, 
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Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica account for approximately 72 per cent of the estimated trade 
creation from the CARICOM-Canada FTA.  
 
The countries expected to least benefit from trade creation are those that belong to the OECS. 
Comparing trade creation obtained from liberalizing imports from the EU, the trade creation on 
existing Canadian imports is significantly lower. 
  
The impact of liberalizing tariffs on imports from Canada is expected to have a greater adverse 
revenue effect on members of the OECS. The members of the OECS are expected to experience 
considerable customs revenue losses. This tariff revenue loss would be more significant for these 
countries as they are more dependent on tariffs as a source of fiscal revenue as compared to 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. All CARICOM member states experience losses in welfare in 
each of the three experiments. Notably, the liberalization of tariffs on EU imports only yields the 
largest losses in welfare as compared to Canadian only and EU and Canada only for both years 
in which the experiments were conducted.  
 
The room for increased trade between CARICOM countries and Canada also appears to be weak 
given the results of the revealed comparative advantage index, the transition matrices and the 
trade complementarity test. In particular, the number of commodities in which the listed 
CARICOM countries have comparative advantage with Canada dwindles away over the time 
period for the most part. Furthermore, the inability of at least three of the listed CARICOM 
countries to maintain strong comparative advantage in relation to Canada over time as well as the 
lack of trade complementarity between CARICOM countries and Canada does not offer 
encouraging signs for enhancing merchandise trade.   
 
The findings of the partial equilibrium model, the evolution of comparative advantage and trade 
complementarity presented in this paper does not provide evidence to suggest that a FTA 
between CARICOM and Canada will yield considerable positive benefits for CARICOM 
countries, especially from a merchandise trade perspective. In this regard, the negotiations of the 
FTA should take a cautious route so as to mitigate the direct and indirect negative effects on 
CARICOM countries. In particular, CARICOM would need to identify vulnerable product lines 
that would need provisional protection from the liberalization of tariffs on Canadian imports. The 
continued protection of such industries would be of significant importance for the region. 
 
Furthermore, a serious look at trade in services may provide a more positive outlook for the 
FTA. Notably, trade in services is not currently covered by the CARIBCAN trade arrangement. 
Importantly however, the services sector is the largest sector and contributes the most to GDP for 
most of the CARICOM economies. Chaitoo (2009, 2013) noted that the services sector in 
CARICOM has the potential to account for the largest new benefits from the CARICOM-Canada 
FTA. However, Girvan (2009) warned that even the prospective benefits from trade in services 
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may be minimal as the services exports that originate from the region presently do not 
necessarily need a FTA to thrive in the Canadian economy. 
 
Moreover, as the FTA provides greater market access for CARICOM countries, the negotiations 
should focus on mechanisms that would assist CARICOM countries to take advantage of the 
opportunities in the Canadian market. In this regard, negotiations from a CARICOM outlook 
should also place emphasis on AfT and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) among other 
mechanisms through which greater trade can be nurtured in the FTA.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: CARICOM countries trade with Canada (2008-2010) 
CARICOM countries exports to Canada US$mn 
  2008 2009 2010 
ATG 0.00 0.11 0.30 
BHS 32.67 22.64 15.19 
BLZ 1.13 1.12 0.62 
BRB 9.19 9.66 7.61 
DMA 0.06 0.06 - 
GRD 0.89 - 0.00 
GUY 215.12 267.30 356.26 
JAM 257.52 125.52 162.02 
KNA 0.00 0.00 0.04 
LCA 0.38 0.00 0.00 
SUR 251.24 375.79 577.42 
TTO 192.03 61.18 175.53 
VCT 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Total 960.29 863.41 1295.03 
CARICOM countries imports from Canada US$mn 
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ATG 0.00 9.26 7.36 
BHS 11.44 14.03 16.03 
BLZ 7.05 6.11 5.46 
BRB 58.48 50.95 52.66 
DMA 6.31 4.03 4.20 
GRD 10.06 7.18 0.00 
GUY 18.05 26.00 44.64 
JAM 131.58 106.67 91.72 
KNA 6.74 4.85 5.47 
LCA 11.86 0.00 0.00 
SUR 7.11 47.77 11.85 
TTO 260.69 149.00 183.98 
VCT 7.89 6.85 19.12 
Total 537.27 432.68 442.49 
Source: World Integrated Trade System (2013).  
 
Table A2: Data sources 
Variable Description Source 
Partial equilibrium model 
Imports 
Value of imports for each of the 
selected CARICOM member states 
at the SITC – two digit level 
(revision 3). 
UN Comtrade database. 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/ 
 
Elasticities 
 
Import demand elasticities and 
elasticities of substitution between 
preferred and non-preferred trading 
partners.  
Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) 
 
Tariff 
 
 
Extra regional tariff (%) 
 
Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) 
Trade indices 
 
Trade complementarity index 
 
Value of exports to the various 
destinations in US$mn. 
UN Comtrade database. 
http://comtrade.un.org/db 
 
RCA index. 
 
Value of exports to the various 
destinations in US$mn. 
UN Comtrade database. 
http://comtrade.un.org/db 
 
 
Table A3: Inter-temporal changes in The Bahamas RCA with Canada 
SITC Description  2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (7) 
112 Alcoholic beverages 13.89 0.00 
516 Organic chemicals, n.e.s. 1.64 0.00 
523 Metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids 1.01 0.00 
597 
Prepared additives for mineral oils etc.; liquids for hydraulic transmissions; 
antifreezes and deicing fluids; lubricating preparations 3.92 0.00 
635 Wood manufactures, n.e.s. 1.44 0.00 
792 
Aircraft and associated equipment; spacecraft (including satellites) and 
spacecraft launch vehicles; and parts thereof 2.41 0.55 
896 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 3.81 0.02 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (5) 
282 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting ingots of iron or steel 0.00 53.79 
 28 
515 
Organic-inorganic compounds, heterocyclic compounds, nucleic acids and their 
salts 0.14 158.26 
676 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections, including sheet piling 0.00 1.13 
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 0.08 1.17 
749 Nonelectric parts and accessories of machinery, n.e.s. 0.00 2.12 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (5) 
036 
Fish, dried, slated or in brine; smoked fish (whether or not cooked before or 
during the smoking process); flours, meals n pellets r fish, fit f human 
consumption 353.53 32.90 
269 Worn clothing and other worn textile articles; rags 171.45 52.39 
278 Crude minerals, n.e.s. 43.29 4.02 
291 Crude animal materials, n.e.s. 15.14 4.17 
553 Perfumery, cosmetics, or toilet preparations, excluding soaps 9.54 3.61 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
Table A4: Inter-temporal changes in Barbados’ RCA with Canada 
SITC Description  2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (15) 
881 Photographic apparatus and equipment, n.e.s. 61.72 0.38 
098 Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. 15.78 0.28 
883 
Cinematographic film, exposed and developed, whether or not incorporating sound 
track or consisting only of sound track. 13.08 0.00 
091 Margarine and shortening. 12.75 0.16 
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s. 11.87 0.66 
695 Tools for use in the hand or in machines. 8.71 0.74 
813 Lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 7.40 0.01 
884 Optical goods, n.e.s. 4.42 0.09 
054 
Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved; roots, tubers and other edible 
vegetable products, n.e.s., fresh or dried 2.71 0.01 
696 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 2.60 0.00 
511 
Hydrocarbons, n.e.s. and their halogenated, sulfonated, nitrated or nitrosated 
derivatives 1.59 0.00 
581 tubes, pipes and hoses of plastics 1.55 0.00 
764 
Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; and parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus 
falling within telecommunications, etc. 1.26 0.09 
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 1.23 0.02 
723 Civil engineering and contractors' plant and equipment 1.09 0.00 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (13) 
897 
Jewellery, goldsmiths' and silversmiths' wares, and other articles of precious or 
semiprecious materials, n.e.s.  0.53 6.74 
727 Food-processing machines (excluding domestic)  0.21 1.46 
658 Made-up articles, wholly or chiefly of textile materials, n.e.s.  0.18 1.13 
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s.  0.02 10.12 
899 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  0.02 5.86 
885 Watches and clocks  0.02 8.21 
848 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of other than textile fabrics; headgear of 
all materials  0.02 1.74 
841 
Men's or boys' coats, jackets, suits, trousers, shirts, underwear etc. of woven textile 
fabrics (except swimwear and coated or laminated apparel)  0.00 1.17 
831 
Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, binocular and camera cases, handbags, wallets, etc. 
of leather, etc.; travel sets for personal toilet, sewing, etc.  0.00 2.04 
291 Crude animal materials, n.e.s.  0.00 47.42 
612 Manufactures of leather or composition leather, n.e.s.; saddlery and harness  0.00 101.28 
 29 
282 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting ingots of iron or steel  0.00 38.15 
525 Radioactive and associated materials  0.00 8.68 
061 Sugars, molasses, and honey  0.00 1.34 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (8) 
112 Alcoholic beverages  97.56 84.46 
001 Live animals other than animals of division 03 21.72 2.88 
896 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 5.31 1.82 
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen  3.63 2.33 
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. 3.03 2.07 
893 Articles, n.e.s. of plastics  2.58 1.60 
792 
Aircraft and associated equipment; spacecraft (including satellites) and spacecraft 
launch vehicles; and parts thereof  2.17 2.17 
048 Cereal preparations and preparations of flour or starch of fruits or vegetables  1.86 1.51 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
Table A5: Inter-temporal changes in Guyana’s RCA with Canada 
SITC Description  2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (2) 
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen 3.83 0.69 
843 
Men's or boys' coats, capes, jackets, suits, blazers, trousers, shirts, etc. (except 
swimwear or coated apparel), knitted or crocheted textile fabric 1.32 0.00 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (5) 
282 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting ingots of iron or steel 0.00 53.79 
515 
Organic-inorganic compounds, heterocyclic compounds, nucleic acids and their 
salts 
0.14 158.26 
676 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections, including sheet piling 0.00 1.13 
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 0.08 1.17 
749 Nonelectric parts and accessories of machinery, n.e.s. 0.00 2.12 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (1) 
285 Aluminium ores and concentrates (including alumina) 10.86 1.44 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
Table A6: Inter-temporal changes in Jamaica’s RCA with Canada 
SITC Description  2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (4) 
056 Vegetables, roots and tubers, prepared or preserved, n.e.s. 1.11 0.22 
074 Tea and mate 1.01 0.53 
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s. 1.17 0.49 
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour materials 1.29 0.39 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (3) 
045 Cereals, unmilled (other than wheat, rice, barley and maize) 0.00 1.78 
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 0.79 1.00 
282 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting ingots of iron or steel 0.03 9.23 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (8) 
024 Cheese and curd 2.25 1.39 
048 Cereal preparations and preparations of flour or starch of fruits or vegetables 1.58 1.04 
054 
Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved; roots, tubers and other edible 
vegetable products, n.e.s., fresh or dried 5.06 3.70 
058 Fruit preserved, and fruit preparations (excluding fruit juices) 13.52 7.14 
075 Spices 8.85 5.22 
098 Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. 2.06 1.17 
112 Alcoholic beverages 5.90 9.97 
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285 Aluminium ores and concentrates (including alumina) 426.68 285.73 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
Table A7: Inter-temporal changes in St. Vincent and the Grenadines RCA with Canada 
SITC Description  2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (10) 
635 Wood manufactures, n.e.s. 9.84 0.33 
759 
Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with office 
machines or automatic data processing machines 2.93 0.14 
898 
Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof; records, tapes and other 
sound or similar recordings (excluding photographic film, etc.) 1.17 0.01 
022 Milk and cream and milk products other than butter or cheese 66.71 0.00 
579 Waste, parings and scrap, of plastics 26.79 0.00 
112 Alcoholic beverages 8.75 0.00 
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen 3.49 0.00 
036 
Crustaceans molluscs, aquatic invrtbrts frsh (lve/dead) ch sltd etc.; crustaceans 
in shll ckd by stm r blng wtr wh r nt ch fz drd flr mls pllts hum cnsmp 2.91 0.00 
659 Floor coverings, etc. 1.40 0.00 
774 
Electro-diagnostic apparatus for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary 
sciences and radiological apparatus 1.11 0.00 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (15) 
883 
Cinematographic film, exposed and developed, whether or not incorporating 
sound track or consisting only of sound track 0.00 438.62 
881 Photographic apparatus and equipment, n.e.s. 0.00 61.06 
001 Live animals other than animals of division 03 0.00 23.44 
273 Stone, sand and gravel 0.00 13.54 
282 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting ingots of iron or steel 0.00 8.78 
288 Nonferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s. 0.00 2.72 
657 Special yarns, special textile fabrics and related products 0.00 1.79 
763 
Sound recorders or reproducers; television image and sound recorders or 
reproducers 0.00 1.77 
792 
Aircraft and associated equipment; spacecraft (including satellites) and 
spacecraft launch vehicles; and parts thereof 0.00 3.20 
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts thereof, n.e.s. 0.00 6.17 
874 
Measuring, checking, analysing and controlling instruments and apparatus, 
n.e.s. 0.07 1.08 
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s. 0.26 100.95 
764 
Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; and parts, n.e.s., and accessories of 
apparatus falling within telecommunications, etc. 0.28 3.04 
058 Fruit preserved, and fruit preparations (excluding fruit juices) 0.56 1.75 
098 Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. 0.63 1.29 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (8) 
892 Printed matter 1.19 2.01 
813 Lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 1.49 2.72 
745 
Nonelectrical machinery, tools and mechanical apparatus, and parts thereof, 
n.e.s. 1.81 1.66 
054 
Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved; roots, tubers and other 
edible vegetable products, n.e.s., fresh or dried 2.94 5.54 
845 
Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics, whether or not knitted or crocheted, 
n.e.s. 6.77 16.25 
821 Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions 10.22 2.73 
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and similar stuffed furnishings 
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 44.15 20.91 
075 Spices 1397.42 214.84 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
Table A8: Inter-temporal changes in Trinidad and Tobago’s RCA with Canada 
SITC Description 2000-2002 2008-2010 
Sectors that lost comparative advantage (6) 
676 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections, including sheet piling 42.92 0.00 
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. 2.61 0.36 
062 Sugars, molasses, and honey 2.53 0.95 
016 
Meat and edible meat offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and 
meals of meat or meat offal 
1.45 0.00 
112 Alcoholic beverages 1.38 0.97 
054 
Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved; roots, tubers and other 
edible vegetable products, n.e.s., fresh or dried 
1.34 0.67 
Sectors that gained comparative advantage (2) 
035 
Fish, dried, slated r in brine; smoked fish (whether r not cooked before or during 
the smoking process); flours, meals n pellets r fish, fit f human consumption 
0.47 2.54 
343 Natural gas, whether or not liquefied 0.00 18.51 
Sectors that retained comparative advantage (6) 
671 
Pig iron and spiegeleisen, sponge iron, iron or steel granules and powders and 
ferroalloys 
553.20 210.47 
334 
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals (other than crude), and products 
therefrom containing 70% (by wt) or more of these oils, n.e.s. 
24.34 3.47 
512 
Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols and their halogenated, sulfonated, nitrated or 
nitrosated derivatives 
19.66 202.22 
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen 15.42 7.06 
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s. 11.50 4.25 
075 Spices 8.88 4.75 
Source: UN Comtrade (2012) and own calculations.  
 
